

How to Develop the National Security Community's National Intelligence University (NIU)



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Why the Need for a National Intelligence University?

Executive Summary

Since the 9/11 attacks there has been extensive review of the intelligence and homeland security communities. These reviews have been in terms of their ability to identify and respond to existing and emerging threats, be they man- or nature-made. Both communities have been found wanting especially in the area of analysis. This has been attributed in great part to the lack of a unified approach to analysis across all of the National Security Community agencies. To instill a sense of community among all of the players whether law enforcement, national intelligence, or homeland security, there is an immediate need for a National Defense Intelligence (NDI)-sponsored¹ Education and Learning Program (ELP) to begin the changes.

This call for a unified approach has been codified by the President, Congressional guidance, and the 911 Commission Report. The need has been verified in law, statements of strategies, and recommendations calling for the development of a National Intelligence University (NIU) as a top priority to help jump start the need to create change via a focused education program. As a result, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is required to establish a college for National Security Community joint² learning services and curricula. To further illustrate, the [Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction](#) did not mince words. The commission recommended the university "could be built easily and at modest expense on top of existing...infrastructure." Amid a rapidly changing threat climate, this new entity will be charged with the challenging mission to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of National Security Community's "connectiveness" through innovative and broad reaching education. The goal is to provide all National Security Community elements — law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security agencies — with strategies and skills necessary to develop professional, technical, and managerial excellence within a common and unified work environment. To this end, the DNI's strategic plan calls for cost effective, state-of-the-art education, learning experiences, and assistance in modern analytical practices to the National Security Community.

It is within this context that CACI has formed an unsolicited educational partnership/consortium with several firms, educational institutions, and consultants³ to help meet this goal. We are passionate about the idea that there is a need for a "new" kind of analyst that has the education, contacts, personal skills, and authority to cover the entire spectrum of national security analysis. This new analyst will use his or her extensive cross-discipline learning to actively participate in this full government analysis environment. To meet this goal, we would suggest there are Four Key Interdisciplinary Functional Areas (FKIFA) where these new analysts could make an impact:

¹ In its broadest context, analysis is operationally defined as the art (intuition) and science (analytical techniques) of dealing with issue resolution involving clarification, prioritization, problem solving, decision making, and devising potential problem/opportunity plans

² "Joint" is a term used by National Security Community educators to describe courses or experiential learning services that meet a common need or requirement and is generic for all Intelligence, Homeland Security, and Law Enforcement agencies.

³ Some of our partners are Accenture, TATA, TAC, Spectral, The Intelligence & Security Academy, Idea Sciences, CFLCS, TAMU, New Mexico University, Mercyhurst College, University of MD, Dr. Barry Frew, Pherson Associates to name a few. The intention is to incorporate at least one university from each state with TAMU being the guiding institution.

- Targeting or target analysis, i.e. bring both analysts and analysis to bear in determining what “dots (intelligence and information) need to be collected. The purpose here is to smartly and more efficiently guide targeting efforts so that they can be relevant and “on target” as possible. This is the initial requirements identification phase.
- Collection of Intelligence and Information relevant in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and predicting and avoiding other DHS kinds of national disasters. In other words, use all-source analysts, working in a Collection Management Officer (CMO) or “Reports Officer”-like mode, to provide real-time input, feedback and target adjustment requirements to the collectors (whether they be CIA clandestine HUMINT collectors, other national “INTs” or LEAs and police forces in DHS’ domain who have eyes and ears on targets). Call it course correction on requirements as needed. Target analysis never ends; therefore, it is iterative and requires constant and continuing analytical/targeting input. Our NIU-trained analyst will not wait passively to receive “take” (from whatever INT), but will CMO-like actively help drive and direct the collection.
- Analysis of the “take” received from the collectors, i.e., the analysts, who — in actual function — are a “hybrid” of pure analysts and DO/NCS CMOs, do a quick evaluation of the incoming (all-source/INT) intelligence/information.
- Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence/Information to the relevant policy makers, DHS, first responders and military, i.e., our NIU analysts must learn so that they know to whom the actionable information should go in real-time and should stand by to take revised/updated requirements from the user/operator to funnel back to the collectors (targeting and target analysis never end).

We are resolute in putting strong emphasis at the NIU in facilitating analysts to be relevant throughout this information gathering, evaluative and distribution cycle, not just in the purely analytical phase. To that end, it is our objective to secure funding for a DNI-sponsored study of the issues surrounding the implementation of the NIU to include cost, location, size, basic curricula, and mission definition. We would propose a quick turn-around study of no more than two months to gain further insight into how this university should be established.

What are the Factors that are Driving the Need for a National Intelligence University Program?

Drivers of Change

The DNI’s strategy focuses on what the National Security Community needs to be and, to a large extent, is defining what it intends to become. Because effective and efficient administrative decisions are driven by both internal and external considerations, the National Security Community’s performance objectives center on factors that include, but are not limited to: (1) law and policy directives, (2) environmental factors and trends, (3) new developments in learning and instructional technology, (4) impact of cost effectiveness and continuous improvement of the analysis curricula, and (5) implications on the size of the workforce. The suggested formulation of a DNI-sponsored education and learning program can best be represented by reviewing factors in such as way as to identify the key issues that face a development program such as this.

Laws and Policy Directives

Several recent legislative and policy initiatives have important implications for the development of an NIU and define in fairly clear language the expectations of the Congress and President. First, the [911 Commission Report](#) charged the DNI with the education, learning, and career development of analysis personnel across the National Security Community. The language from that report that follows below indicates a broad expansion of the DNI’s responsibilities to ensure the further development of a collaborative and creative analytic workforce:

“The National Intelligence Director would set personnel policies to *establish standards for education and developmental learning experiences...*”⁴

“The leadership of the intelligence community should be able to pool information...to a common standard of quality in how it is collected, processed (i.e. translated), reported, shared, and analyzed. A common set of personnel standards for intelligence can *create a group of professionals better able to operate in joint activities, transcending their own service-specific mind-sets.*”⁵

There can be no doubt that the DNI has the charter for this action. We believe the aforementioned FKIFA can serve as general guidelines for developing those specific standards.

Second, the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (October 2005) provides documentation for the need, roles, responsibilities, and procedures of stakeholders in the National Security Community’s NIU initiative. Among the strategic objectives put forth in the document, a few are directly focused on this need. For example, “strengthen analytic expertise, methods, and practices”, “developing new methodologies, including specialized training and career development”, “make attention to long-term analysis a part of every analyst’s assigned responsibilities, train analysts to anticipate,” and finally, “build and sustain the expertise and capacity of the Intelligence Community’s analyst ‘corps.’” Additionally, law enforcement and homeland security have similar directives.

Third, there are executive orders which provide the legal requirement for professional development of the National Security Community analysis work force. The Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the President’s National Performance Review (NPR) document list expectations of better analytical practices that will streamline operations and increase effectiveness across the Federal Government to include the National Security Community. The DoD’s Defense Performance Review (DPR) has the mission of implementing the National Performance Review (NPR) for the DoD to include military intelligence. Each of the 12 streamlining initiatives of the DPR address steps are needed to deploy a quality culture throughout the DoD and the National Security Community.

All of these independent, but comprehensive, laws and policies indicate a need for an NIU as soon as possible. It will be almost impossible to effect organizational, technological, and cultural change without a new and independent force to drive that change. While there are concerns about how to go about this without creating a “group think” mentality,⁶ there is no denying the need for implementing a rapid prototype of this university.

Analysis and Professional Development Trends

As demonstrated via the previous section, there is political and executive commitment to reform the way government accomplishes its intelligence analysis work. A major thrust of the current initiatives is to integrate improvement efforts into a systematic framework that encompasses the entire National Security Community. “A ‘smart’ government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence.”⁷ This would suggest there is a movement towards incorporating both intuitive and data driven processes into a robust analytical capability. Again our FKIFA are, by our definition, the framework to which these “smart” approaches might be codified.

⁴ 911 Commission Report, p.414

⁵ 911 Commission Report

⁶ Wanted: A new school for spies, Shaun Waterman, UPI Homeland and National Security Editor

⁷ 911 Commission Report, p.401

There is a need to incorporate these improved techniques' efforts into the development and delivery of education and learning materials to develop the National Security Community work force. In addition, there is an emphasis being placed on the implementation of developing a collaborative knowledge environment involving trusted networks and "information rights management" to support the efforts analysis. To quote the National Intelligence Strategy when discussing strengthening analytic expertise; "analytic judgments...must be the product of an enterprise that values differing perspectives, nurtures and rewards expertise, and is agile and innovative in the way it deploys...that expertise."⁸ All of this points to the need to develop broad based "knowledge" managers using different types of data (Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, i.e. all source) rather than continuing to focus on specific stovepipe individual specialties (e.g. being only a signals analyst vice a weapons systems expert). This is, however, not to say that specific technical expertise is not required. One only needs to refer to the recent past history of Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) management to see the dangers of not keeping pace with the quality and quantity of analysts required to do the job. The goal should be to find an effective mix of the two types of learning.

So given the need for integration, collaboration, and a horizontally-networked community, there are many technological and cultural issues yet to be addressed. But those cultural and technical changes will not come about on their own. We need to develop and motivate a national level analytic work force right from the beginning of their employment to think in terms of these new and emerging analysis concepts (unified, collaborative, technically competent). Further, to do this will require an education and experiential learning program that will focus on professional development as well as skill development. Examples of these areas to invest in are trends in national/international issues, Senior Executive Service, national security policies and issues, inner workings of Capitol Hill, and how agencies could complement and collaborate.⁹

New Developments in Learning Technology and Instructional Methodology

New developments in accelerated interactive e-learning (applying new science principles in a sense and respond mode), competency-based education (based on knowledge, skills, process abilities, and personal attributes), facilitate-the-facilitator (developing to coach, mentor and teach others), brain compatible learning (applying multi-sensory adult education principles), and total quality education (employing People-Capability Maturity Model) will also significantly impact the strategies in developing courses and services. Additionally, the power of emerging technologies, such as tele-training and multi-media interactive courseware, will allow for the evolution of selected segments of core courses to be made available and delivered in a cost-effective distant learning environment. This increased flexibility will significantly leverage future resources and the capability to deliver a wide variety of high quality education and learning to the work force.

In addition to these advances in Learning Technology, organizations such as DHS are implementing new tools that allow greater efficiency in managing their people. The implementation of the MAXhr human capital system is key to tracking the activities of their employees, in addition to helping manage training. It is through the use of systems such as this, where DHS training councils and groups have the technical personnel data to deal with the complex issues of training within 22 different functional agencies. Gaining access to MAXhr would be critical to solving the training challenges of one of three major players within the National Security Community.

⁸ National Intelligence Strategy, p.12

⁹ The Intelligence Education Framework for the 21st Century, Sidney E. Fuchs, President, TASC Business Unit, Northrop Grumman Information Technology

However, all of the technology in the world can not compensate for the capabilities of the people who operate those systems. The NIU consortium places a very high value on personal experience both within individual agencies and with cross discipline/all-source analysis. Our team mates within the consortium have those credentials in both technical and managerial leadership positions. This allows us to pass on that experienced knowledge in such a way as to more quickly create the learning ethos that the government directives have indicated.

Cost Effectiveness as it Relates to Continuous Improvement of the Analysis Curricula

Delivering a thoughtful and relevant curricula and services to the market in a cost effective manner is a high priority. Implementing current state-of-the-art interactive distance learning technology (interactive e-learning) is critical to achieving cost effectiveness in today's fiscally tight environment. The importance of developing a cost effective ELP, while improving quality and meeting customer expectations, cannot be overemphasized especially with the renewed effort to acculturate the workforce.

Further, the development and use of performance-based metrics (to achieve efficiency and effectiveness) are crucial for determining measures of success of these ELPs. They are also an excellent way to help in "lessons learned" situations where the immediate outcome was not successful. So, a quality assurance program is an important supporting tool ensuring the cost effectiveness of these programs. At the end of the day, as better analysis services and products evolve across the entire National Security Community enterprise, the more the desired capability will be achieved in support of operational requirements, thereby satisfying the direction given by Congress.

Size of the Workforce

Many factors will affect the future work force in terms of size and expected skills. Among those factors are the loss of highly experienced personnel due to retiring (or in some case disgruntled employees as witnessed at CIA recently) and the increasing use of technology which will result in less specialization more breadth/knowledge. In addition, there will be greater demands for the members of the National Security Community work force to broaden their capability to perform especially since initial recruitment is so difficult and time consuming due to the clearance process. The impact of these trends will pose additional challenges to the National Security Community as it coordinates the design and delivery of education and learning.

Education and Learning, the Keystone

A well acculturated work force is a prerequisite for remedying the underlying causes of the National Security Community's lack of collaboration. An accepted premise is the need to maintain both a professional and technical edge in analysis through collaborative education and learning experiences. Our education and learning strategy for meeting future challenges may be categorized into five components:

- Educate the newly hired professional in technical skills of collaborative analysis
- Structure supervisory, managerial, leadership, and executive development to develop the "knowledge" worker
- Develop collaborative interpersonal skills, we have Q-metric qualified teachers
- Build a collaborative knowledge environment to support the new collaborative interpersonal skills
- Develop cross disciplined intelligence professionals capable of extensive strategic vision and insight into both future analytic needs and emerging threats before they happen

However, there are areas that still need attention if this program is to be successful. One such area that has been especially neglected is the development of interpersonal leadership skills. Best-in-class companies in private industry are investing up to a month a year in enhancing interpersonal capabilities. Companies such as General Electric, Hewlett Packard, and Xerox, to name a few, spend no less than seven percent of their payroll on education and learning. Given the global nature and complexity of national security we should be doing nothing less than private industry.

Second, the parochial nature of intelligence learning would suggest there are potentially numerous course duplications in analysis and other courses plus inaction to fix shortfalls in analytic learning opportunities across the National Security Community. A concerted effort is needed to both eliminate duplications as well as consolidate existing baseline programs. Moreover, there is a need to redirect effective state-of-the-art education and learning experiences that respond to evolving emerging practices in analysis and technology.

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Within DHS we see the need to review the current curricula. Some components have schools that provide specialized or general education and learning. To further illustrate the point, the US Coast Guard utilizes the Leadership Development Center in New London CT whereby the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducts supervisory development at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Leadership Development Center in Dallas TX. This is not to pass judgment on the possible duplication of courses, but merely to identify the need to review and evaluate these courses to find common traits that might be combined into a broader course of instruction (in this case leadership development, that might have applicability across the entire National Security Community). To further help support these efforts, the DHS has now developed its first ever department level learning plan, called the Department of Homeland Security Learning and Development Strategic plan, which will provide the vision¹⁰ for future learning initiatives. We would propose to build off of these efforts.

Third, in conjunction with the need for great analysis learning experiences, there is also the need to improve supervisory, managerial, and leadership abilities in the context of operating a connected self-organizing organization and team. This is one of the key areas we discussed earlier in the paper, but it is worth mentioning again. Leadership will be the key to success for these programs, and we must develop the ability to identify those who demonstrate higher order leadership capability. To again quote the National Intelligence Strategy “recruit exceptional individuals from a diverse talent pool and develop them.” Similar to the military who begin developing leadership skills on the first day of their learning environment, so should the NIU as it takes in those who are new to intelligence or even those who are long time veterans who might require additional education/applied learning.

As stated previously, the DNI is required to move towards common systems, policies, budgets, and procedures to create an environment that fosters teamwork and in depth collaboration. Immediate attention is being given to respond to the pressing needs of supporting interoperability across the National Security Community agencies. The ability to connect through cyberspace will be a key component, while requiring a focused and sustained effort, to ensure development and delivery of successful education and learning solutions. There are many issues such as multi-

¹⁰ GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Management of Training for Successful Transformation, Sep 2006, p 11.

level security, incompatible networks, and stand alone data bases, just to name a few, that will provide for additional challenges as we move forward with this initiative. But there are many models and benchmarks to choose from as we widen our search for education “best practices” through out our national and international community.

Summary

The community is getting serious about national security reform. However, as resources are scarce and manpower limited, National Security Community agencies are hard-pressed to afford education and learning experiences just for their own work force, let alone their sister/brother agencies. In the following sections, we will review and examine how we might propose going about developing a system that satisfies these needs.

CACI Consortium Concept Proposal

The idea of developing a National Intelligence University is a daunting task. Expectations are high and there is much risk in taking on this effort. Despite the challenge, CACI as stated previously, has teamed with a superb consortium of senior experts in intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security and applied learning, Universities, and contractors, to design a program that will meet the need for developing this intelligence university. In the following sections, we will describe a notional plan for getting started and then running an NIU. The overall goal is to work in concert with the DNI, law enforcement, and the Department of Homeland Security and all of their supported agencies, to build a road map that will establish the NIU in a minimal amount of time. A final note on the section below, all of the suggestions have been developed before conducting office calls, which is to say, that the NIU consortium stands ready to modify capabilities as directed. So first off let’s establish some boundaries for the NIU program.

Key Assumptions

- DNI as owners will set the policy and funding for this program
- It is assumed all National Security Community agencies will actively participate as members of the NIU Program
- The NIU will be some combination of “brick and mortar” and virtual access
- The NIU will support all areas of curricula development applicable to analysis (Basic Analysis, All Source, Open Source, Specific INTs, Leadership and Creativity/Innovation

Suggested DNI’s Plan at a Macro Level

The first step in implementing the NIU is to take stock of what already exists. We would propose to conduct surveys and focus groups regarding the duties and tasks of various functions in the analysis work force across the National Security Community to validate these perceptions. Additionally, as was mentioned in the DNI [National Intelligence Strategy](#), we would need access to the data base on all National Security Community analysis personnel. We estimate the number of National Security Community analysts, including military and contractor personnel, is approximately 50,000.¹¹ Obviously, this is a significant amount of analysts and it will take some time to gather the data, collate it, and then derive specific options. From the analysis of these data bases we can determine useful demographic information; for example, differentiating personnel between National Security Community agencies and military intelligence services. This will give the DNI Deputy Directors for Collection, Analysis, and Management (HR) empirical data to map one of the key driving forces, work force characteristics,

¹¹ This number will be subject to revision after programs such as DHS’ MAXhr program has obtained more accurate data.

which will influence future education and learning requirements. When we are able to combine such occupational information on a periodic basis, a powerful set of common data can provide the DNI with work force characterization to target specific analysis education and learning requirements.

The work force of the future will undergo significant changes in its transition in meeting the analysis needs of the National Security Community. The following are examples of expected changes in the capabilities of the future work force.

Past	Future
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Less Technically Savvy - Management Oriented - Single-Source INT - Lower Grades - More Dependent - More Occupational Categories - Data Intensive - “Stovepipe” mentality and solutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More Technically Savvy - Leadership Oriented - Multi-source INT - Higher Grades - Knowledge Worker - Fewer Occupational Categories - Knowledge/Systems/Processes Intensive - Four Key Interdisciplinary Functional Areas (FKIFA)

One of the challenges with the workforce is the number of new hires that will require even basic IC learning opportunities. Approximately 15 percent are new employees each year, which includes transfers from other Federal agencies. These new recruits place additional learning requirements on the NIU beyond the existing National Security Community population. While new recruits present a challenge to each individual agency in terms of training, they also represent the future of intelligence and, will to a great degree, become the vanguard of the revolution in intelligence analysis.

Once we have collected and analyzed detailed demographic data on the workforce and the emerging analysis requirements, we will need to develop a wide variety of products and services that are responsive to the requirements of the future work force. The analysis products and services which are necessary include: core curricula in the major functional areas of analysis; specialized education and learning in support of culturing personnel in networking, collaboration, learning community, systems thinking and the application of new science principles; a cost effective technology-based delivery system; and a program of external communication (collaborative knowledge environment) and problem solving (sense and respond adaptive enterprise) to support the future National Security Community work force.

A Phased Approach

We would suggest the use of three connected phases: (1) defining core competencies, (2) establishing Continuing Professional Development (CPD), and (3) developing certification. The plan incorporates two macro styles of education that tie the program together — Instructional Systems Design (ISD) and Career Planning System (CPS).¹² Further, benchmarked existing course offerings within each agency will be expanded to provide a full scope service capability to all of the other National Security Community agencies. This will entail policy updating which will be an excellent place to take on the difficult issues of security and common networks, just to name a few. These policy changes will help facilitate parallel

¹² ISD is an end-to end do-loop process for designing, developing, implementing, assessing, and evaluating curricula. CPS is a people development enterprise solution to provide career paths, learning feedback, incentives, and motivational mechanisms.

Proposed NIU Education and Learning Program for NSC Analysts




Figure 1. Proposed NIU Education and Learning Program for National Security Community Analysts.

development of all three phases of our program. As a final note, it is important to address upfront how program evaluation and performance measurements will be formulated throughout the plan.

The following two diagrams define both NIU model highlights key perspectives to be accomplished across the three phases and notional list of the program structure and objectives:

In order to support the future direction of this quality vision of the DNI NIU Program, a series of related objectives should be executed at the DNI and be made part of the centralized facility operation as well. These objectives are:

- Develop an integrated competency-based education and learning model
- Apply emerging technological delivery systems and methods that promote cost effective, education
- Maintain on-going communication through research, information sharing and collective problem solving




Figure 2. NIU Program Structure and Objectives.

The Long Term Perspective

No matter the source giving direction to change, there frequently is a high degree of skepticism and cynicism at the beginning of any change process. In spite of such obstacles, the NIU's long-term outlook is hopeful. We all realize the NIU is vitally important in changing analysis practices. As a part of this strategy, the DNI is transforming the beliefs and value systems of the evolving analysis culture in National Security Community. Change will come about slowly, especially at first, but continued and senior level emphasis on the program, will ensure success. The move toward competency-based education offers the DNI the capacity to eliminate curriculum overlap, and confusion about levels-of-learning and testing/assessments. The NIU's goal is to focus on pragmatic, practical learning to satisfy the government direction to fix analysis and collaboration among the agencies. This will significantly improve, among other difficult intelligence problems, USSOCOM's GWOT effort to "Find, Fix, and Finish Terrorists." But at the most strategic level, it will result in greater intelligence capability than we have today, given the United States the edge it needs to defeat its enemies or to properly respond to natural disasters.

At the end of the day, it is people who make the National Security Community what it is. Leadership at all levels will be key to a successful implementation. Recent studies show that 85 percent of the variables affecting productivity are internal to the organization. Of the 85 percent, 80 percent can be changed by executive and managerial action. Only 20 percent can be changed by employees.¹³ While a great amount of effort is being expended defining new professional and technical skills in analysis, not to be forgotten, is the investment needed in structuring (1) supervisory, (2) managerial, (3) leadership, and (4) executive development. Whether NIU curricula are professional, technical or supervisory/managerial/leadership in nature, a tremendous amount of learning is required in building relationship skills. Benchmark companies¹⁴ in private industry are investing up to 1/12th of a calendar year in enhancing interpersonal capabilities. But to bring the point closer to the National Security Community, the GAO in a recent report on DHS training recommended the "feasibility of establishing a 21st Century Leadership Training and Development Center."¹⁵ So this is becoming a very popular area of study. This will be one early key curriculum that we would deploy to begin the creation of a common and unified National Security Community.

Final Summary

The DNI's task is not a simple one, for it must establish congruence between the existing National Security Community's agencies curriculum and the student's need to cope with ever increasing complex global problems. Using a consensus-based set of connected teams working with the NIU, the DNI will have the ability to facilitate a strong educational foundation from which the analysis practitioner may ultimately advance confidently to positions of responsibility and leadership within the National Security Community.

The objective of this white paper was to examine the origins and issues associated with the development of a National Intelligence University. It is one of several white papers we are pleased to provide regarding the implementation of the NIU.

About the Author

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¹³ Refer to: Hogan R., Curphy G. and Hogan J. What we know about leadership. American Psychologist, June, 1994.

¹⁴ Refer to: Truell G.F. "Employee Involvement", AMA course, April, 1994.

¹⁵ GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Management of Training for Successful Transformation, Sep 2006, p 14.